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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
CaseNo.20020879-CA 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
: INCARCERATED 
v. 
DOMINIQUE HERNANDEZ, 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION ISSUE 
IS RESOLVED BY REYES. 
The State is correct that Mr. Hernandez's reasonable doubt jury instruction passes 
muster under State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, 527 Ut. Adv. Rep. 10. 
II. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT DEFENSE WITNESSES 
1. The State's Failure to Marshal the Evidence is Dispositive of its Challenge to the Trial 
Court's Findings. 
The State challenges the trial court's finding number 12 as being unsupported by 
the record. Finding 12 provides: 
12. While defendant's trial counsel may not have been told the 
specific names and contact information for Amanda Hernandez and 
Margaret Puebla until after trial, trial counsel had enough information 
before trial to investigate these witnesses. 
(R.423).1 
In challenging this finding, the State does not marshal the evidence which supports 
it, but instead acknowledges in a footnote that Mr. Hernandez's testimony is not included 
in its summary of the supporting evidence because the trial court apparently doubted 
Hernandez's credibility because he did not enter findings reflecting Hernandez's 
testimony. State's brief at 39 n.21.2 
lThe State mistakenly misstates the trial court's findings 11 and 12 as follows: 
• Although defendant did not specifically provide the names of his relatives, 
Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Puebla, who could serve as alibi witnesses, trial 
counsel had sufficient information before trial to investigate them 
(Findings, R. 473 ffif 11-12, Addendum C)[.] 
State's brief at 37. As the State's brief later correctly notes, the trial court actually did not 
find that Hernandez did not provide the names of his relatives, but found that Hernandez 
"may" not have told trial counsel the specific names and contact information until after 
trial. State's brief at 39. 
2If the trial court disbelieved Hernandez, he certainly could have so found. 
The trial court's finding that Hernandez "may" not have given counsel the specific names 
and contact information until after trial is consistent with Hernandez' and trial counsel's 
testimony, which were both uncertain regarding what Hernandez told trial counsel and 
when. Hernandez said he left a message prior to trial for trial counsel to contact him for 
important information pertaining to the case, and that he told him prior to trial that it 
could be verified that he had been on the phone and was waiting for his wire transfer at or 
near the time of the robbery (e.g. R. 478 at 14-15). He thought he probably mentioned this 
to trial counsel at the preliminary hearing (R. 478 at 16). He told counsel the names of 
his aunt and grandma, and gave him his aunt and uncle's phone number to reach them 
both (R. 478 at 29). He also told him about the phone calls right before trial (R. 478 at 
30). He also gave him the contact information two days after trial (R. 478 at 34). 
While trial counsel could not recall having received specific information, he knew 
2 
In order to challenge a factual finding, the State must marshal the evidence and 
"present every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial that supports the finding" it 
challenges, and show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, the 
evidence does not support it. See, e.g.. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
Because the State has failed to marshal the evidence, this Court should summarily 
affirm the trial court's findings 12 and 13, that trial counsel's failure to investigate the 
defense witnesses constituted objectively deficient performance. See Wilson Mfg. Inc. v. 
Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, % 21, 54 P.3d 1177. 
2. Trial Counsel's Failure to Investigate the Possibility of Procuring Defense Witnesses 
Constitutes Objectively Deficient Performance. 
The State asks this Court to adopt case law from other jurisdictions placing the 
burden on the defendants to provide their lawyers with specific information about defense 
witnesses if the defendants later wish to raise claims of ineffective assistance for failure 
to investigate, and contends that the question posed by this case has not been answered by 
that prior to trial, he was supposed to track down witnesses that Hernandez was on the 
phone and might have an alibi (R. 478 at 47, 52). Trial counsel was unsure how many 
times Hernandez tried to tell him about the calls prior to trial (R. 478 at 64, 74). He felt it 
was likely that Hernandez told him his aunt and grandmother would be helpful witnesses, 
but did not think Hernandez gave him names and phone numbers (R. 478 at 74-75). He 
was not comfortable saying he definitely did not receive them prior to trial (R. 478 at 87). 
He was taking Xanax at the time, and this would sometimes cause him to forget parts of 
conversations he had had with people (R. 478 at 84). His high case load also made 
recalling case details difficult (R. 478 at 86). 
3 
the Utah courts. State's brief at 40-41. 
If this Court were to consider this non-controlling case law, the Court should bear 
in mind that criminal defendants may be incarcerated, indigent, unable to communicate 
with their lawyers, and/or completely unaware of the names and contact information for 
witnesses, such as unknown bystanders, and without the personal resources to investigate 
their witnesses. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel (Defendant's Exhibit 17).3 
This Court need not go outside this jurisdiction for case law, however, because this 
case is controlled by State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), which puts the burden 
squarely on the shoulders of trial lawyers to make "reasonable investigations into the 
possibility of procuring defense witnesses." See id- at 187-88 and n.25. 
In Templin, the State tried to avoid a claim of ineffective assistance by arguing 
that the defendant had failed to provide his trial lawyer with the correct name of one 
defense witness until several weeks after the preliminary hearing. The court rejected this 
claim, noting that the lawyer had the time and resources to investigate the case prior to 
3Pending trial, Hernandez was in federal custody in various locations including the 
Weber County Jail (R. 29-34), in Daggett County, and at the Adult Detention Center (R. 
253 at 30). Various hearings had to be continued because he was not transported from 
remote locations. See District Court docket sheet. Prior to the trial, he was sentenced to a 
federal prison in Arizona, and the trial had to be continued so he could return for trial. 
See District Court docket sheet. The district court docket sheet confirms that trial counsel 
was not present at the scheduling conference on May 28, 2002, or pretrial conference on 
July 30, 2002 in district court. See also R. 478 at 13-14, 16. Trial counsel did not know 
how to reach Hernandez prior to trial because Hernandez was in federal custody, and he 
made no effort to reach him (R. 478 at 46). Before trial, the most time trial counsel spent 
with Hernandez was sitting next to him at the preliminary hearing (R. 478 at 75). 
4 
trial, that the defendant's father had been able to locate this witness before trial, and that 
the trial lawyer had made no effort to find the witness prior to trial See id. The court 
explained: 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a 
case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's 
performance cannot fall within the f,wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.M This is because a decision not to investigate cannot be 
considered a tactical decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry has been 
made that counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or not to call 
particular witnesses for tactical reasons. Therefore, because defendant's trial 
counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of 
procuring prospective defense witnesses, the first part of the Strickland test 
has been met. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In the instant matter, Hernandez began asking trial counsel to investigate these 
witnesses at the preliminary hearing, but counsel failed to follow up (R. 478 at 47, 52). 
Assuming that Hernandez did not provide counsel with the names and contact 
information at the preliminary hearing, he again approached counsel regarding this 
defense evidence prior to trial, but counsel was unwilling to investigate because he felt it 
was too late and that they should just do the best they could without investigating (R. 478 
at 47). 
As in Templm, because counsel "did not make a reasonable investigation into the 
possibility of procuring prospective defense witnesses, the first part o the Strickland test 
has been met." Id. 
3. Hernandez was Prejudiced. 
5 
The State challenges the trial court's finding that Hernandez was prejudiced by 
trial counsel's failure to investigate and present the defense witnesses, arguing that there 
was plenty of time for Hernandez to have committed the robbery, even with the defense 
evidence considered. State's brief at 41-43. The State's argument that Hernandez could 
have come and gone from the Flying J in a twenty-four minute window, State's brief at 
43, does not square with the record. 
Dispatch broadcast Nieser's complaint to the police at 6:39 (R. 254 at 49-52). 
According to Nieser's preliminary hearing and trial testimony, the robbery lasted four to 
five minutes, and he waited between five and ten minutes before he went inside to report 
it (R. 254 at 12-15, 19-20, R. 253 at 5). Thus, by subtracting the 9 or 14 minutes for the 
robbery and his recovery period from the dispatch time of 6:39, it appears that the robbery 
began between 6:25 and 6:30 p.m. 
The robbery occurred at Freeway Transmissions, located at 847 West and 1700 
South (R. 254 at 12-15). 
Trial counsel failed to investigate evidence proving that Hernandez was on the 
phone with his aunt from 6:22 to 6:29 p.m., and was again on the phone with his 
grandmother at 6:53 at the Flying J truck stop, located at 21st South and 9th West, making 
arrangements for his grandmother to wire him $45.4 
4See R. 254 at 54-55; Defendant's Exhibits 6 and 21 (telephone bill of Amanda 
Hernandez); State's Exhibit 1 (Affidavit of Kath Panteloglow); R. 478 at 52-55). 
Defendant's Exhibit 12 and 13 (AMA dump and instruction sheet on how to read AMA 
6 
Had defense counsel investigated and presented this evidence, the prosecution's 
theory would have been put to these tests: How could Hernandez be talking on the phone 
at the Flying J and committing the robbery at Freeway Transmissions at the same time? If 
Mr. Hernandez got off the phone with his aunt at 6:29, how did he run some four and a 
half blocks in one minute to commit a robbery at the Freeway Transmission at 6:30? If he 
took over $700 in the robbery, and why was he back at the Flying J at 6:53 without the 
robbery money and calling his grandmother to wire him $45? 
This Court should conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that Hernandez was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to investigate the defense 
witnesses. 
4. Failure to Move for a New Trial 
Because Hernandez purportedly received the "same hearing under rule 23B," the State 
characterizes as superfluous Hernandez's argument that trial counsel should have moved for 
a new trial on the basis of his failure to investigate and present defense witnesses proving 
that he was on the phone at the Flying J at or near the time of the robbery at Freeway 
Dump record, faxed to Legal Defender's Association on November 6, 2002); State's 
Exhibit 3 (Affidavit of Kath Panteloglow); Defendant's Exhibit 7 (phone memo dated 
11/1 at 1:51 p.m., provided from the Legal Defender's file, indicating that Margaret 
Puebla had left word for trial counsel that she would fax something over and could be 
reached at a certain number); Defendant's Exhibits 8 and 22 (Western Union fax dated 
November 1, 2002, reflecting money transfer from Puebla sent to Dominique Nicka 
Hernandez on December 5, 2002, which was later refunded on December 12, 2002); R. 
478 at 55. 
7 
Transmission, blocks away from the Flying J. State's brief at 33 n.18. 
Had trial counsel moved for a new trial, Judge Barrett, who found that Hernandez 
received ineffective assistance in the 23B hearing, presumably would have granted 
Hernandez a new trial for the same reasons he articulated in the 23B hearing. Had Judge 
Barrett granted Hernandez a new trial, the prosecution could not have appealed,5 and this 
case likely would have been resolved in 2002, when Hernandez was sentenced. 
It was two days after sentencing that trial counsel received the specific information 
5Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l current provides, in relevant part: 
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information 
following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a felony charge on the ground that the court's 
suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case; 
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest; 
(d) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger; 
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy 
or denial of a speedy trial; 
(f) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(g) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a 
pending prosecution; 
(h) an order finding, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for 
Execution, that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed; 
(I) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402: or 
(j) an illegal sentence. 
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may 
seek discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before 
jeopardy attaches. 
While it has been amended several times since August of 2002 when Hernandez was 
sentenced, the prosecution did not have a right to appeal from an order granting a new 
trial under any of the versions. 
8 
leading to the phone records showing that Hernandez was on the phone at the Flying J at or 
near the time of the robbery. State's brief at 35. Assuming arguendo that the State is correct 
that Hernandez failed to provide trial counsel with sufficient information prior to trial, 
Hernandez's providing trial counsel with the information two days after sentencing gave him 
ample time to move for a new trial with that information. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24.6 
Because trial counsel's failure to move for a new trial was both objectively deficient 
and prejudicial, this Court should order a new trial. 
5. The Error was Not Harmless. 
The State contends that the trial court did not find that Hernandez likely would have 
received a more favorable outcome at trial in the absence of the ineffective assistance, but 
only found that the presence of these witnesses would have strengthened the defense. State's 
brief at 44-45. The trial court actually made two separate findings, one indicating that the 
6The rule provides: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a 
new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts 
in support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits 
or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time 
as it deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition 
of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-
day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
9 
witnesses would have provided Hernandez with a stronger defense, and one indicating that 
Hernandez was prejudiced by the failure to investigate and call the witnesses (R. 475 at fflf 
19-20). 
The State contends that any error in the failure to investigate the defense witnesses 
was harmless. State's brief at 43-45. 
Where the only evidence connecting Hernandez to the robbery was the unreliable 
eyewitness identification testimony of Nieser, where Hernandez did not match the robber's 
description, and where Hernandez was seized by the police about thirty minutes after the 
robbery and did not have the $700 plus dollars taken in the robbery, see Opening Brief of 
Appellant at 47-49 and n.8., evidence confirming that he was at the Flying J during or up to 
a minute before the robbery happened, and waiting around the Flying J to get $45 shortly 
after the robbery, as he told the police, could easily have made the difference between a 
verdict of guilty and a verdict of not guilty. Cf State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 
1990)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in part because counsel 
failed to call witnesses to bolster the defendants testimony). 
B. FAILURE TO EXCLUDE HERNANDEZ'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
The State argues that Hernandez cannot show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to move to timely exclude Hernandez's criminal history, because Hernandez did not 
testify and the prior conviction thus did not come in. State's brief at 30-33, citing Luce v. 
United States. 469 U.S. 38 (1984); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987); and 
10 
State v. Kirkwood, 2002 UT App 128., 47 P.3d 111. 
If Hernandez's only claim were that the trial court erred in admitting the prior 
conviction, the State's authorities would control, and would require him to have testified 
to raise the issue on appeal. See Luce (requiring defendant to testify to preserve issue 
regarding admission of prior conviction under federal rule 609); Gentry (following Luce 
under Utah R. Evid. 609); Kirkwood (applying Luce requirement in the context of 404(b) 
rulings). 
However, because Hernandez is raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, the controlling analysis is the general Strickland test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See, e ^ , State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1996). Mr. Arguelles 
claimed on appeal that he did not testify because his lawyer gave him faulty advice that if 
he took the stand, his criminal history would be admitted. Id. The court analyzed this 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the general Strickland standard, and 
rejected the claim, because Arguelles had failed to show prejudice by presenting record 
proof that he would have testified or the substance of his testimony. Id. at 441-42. 
In the instant matter, the record shows that Mr. Hernandez wished to testify in his 
own behalf, and if he had not been dissuaded from doing so by the prospect of having his 
prior robbery conviction admitted, would have testified that he did not commit the 
robbery (R. 478 at 16-17, 68). He would have testified that he was on the phone at the 
Flying J Truck stop, on a call to his relatives at or near the time of the robbery, and was 
11 
waiting for the money transfer from his grandmother (R. 478 at 11, 17-18). Thus, the 
record is sufficient for this Court grant a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 34-40. 
C. INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLET 
The State concedes objectively deficient performance in trial counsel's 
introduction of Hernandez's wallet containing evidence that he was on parole and may 
have been involved in a needle exchange program. State's brief at 48. 
The State argues that there was no prejudice under State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 
(Utah 1989). State's brief at 48-49. In Bruce, the trial court ruled prior to trial that the 
defendant's prior conviction was admissible, and trial counsel "pulled the sting"7 of this 
ruling, by eliciting the conviction first, rather than waiting for the prosecution to reveal 
this damaging piece of evidence. Id. at 657. On appeal, the court found that the 
conviction was actually not admissible, but that the error was harmless because of trial 
counsel's simple elicitation of the conviction, which was not reiterated by the 
prosecution. Id. 
In contrast here, the trial court did not rule that the jurors should be exposed to the 
evidence in Hernandez's wallet indicating that he was on parole and may have been 
involved in a needle exchange program. Trial counsel did not introduce the evidence in 
This is not language from the Bruce opinion, but is common parlance for this 
technique. 
12 
an effort to blunt its damaging effect, but was wholly unaware of the contents of the 
wallet when he asked the court's permission to admit and publish this exhibit to the 
jurors. See Defendant's Exhibit 18; R. 478 at 67. Bruce is thus inapposite. 
In its argument that the error was harmless, the State claims that Hernandez was 
found with "the 'silvered' gun identified by the victim" at the time of his arrest. State's 
brief at 49. The dispatch report originating from Nieser indicated that the robber's gun 
was black (R. 254 at 74). At the preliminary hearing, Nieser described the gun as grey 
with some silver or chrome on it (R. 253 at 1-3, 9). At trial, he identified the gun the 
police seized from Hernandez as the robber's gun, despite the fact that the gun is not 
black and has no silver or chrome (R. 254 at 34-35).8 
The introduction of the wallet was not harmless. See Opening Brief of Appellant 
at 41-42. 
D. FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS THE GUN AND STATEMENTS 
The State argues that the encounter prior to the frisk of Hernandez was consensual, 
and that prior to Hernandez's admission that he had a gun, Officer Mclnnes asked him, 
"'Being that this crime involved a gun, do you mind if I Terry frisk you for a weapon?'" 
State's brief at 23. The State's quotation cites to R. 253: 18; 254: 56-57. State's brief at 
8The State argues "there was no evidence presented at trial that the gun was not 
black or that it had no silver or chrome on it." State's brief at 19 n.9. The gun found on 
Hernandez was admitted as an exhibit at trial (R. 254 at 62). Counsel for Hernandez has 
asked the trial court clerk to forward that exhibit to this Court. 
13 
23. 
The State's quotation of the preliminary hearing testimony of Officer Brede is 
accurate. See R. 253: 18. However, at trial, Officer Brede's testimony was not that 
Mclnnes asked permission to search Hernandez. Rather, he testified that Mclnnes 
informed Hernandez, "To make sure, for our safety, I'm going to frisk you for weapons." 
(R. 254 at 57).9 
The test of whether an encounter has gone beyond consensual to a level two 
seizure is whether "'a reasonable person, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he 
believes he is not free to leave[.]"f See, e ^ , State v. Hargraves. 806 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
In this case, the officers approached Hernandez and asked him to go to a stairwell 
outside the television room so they could have some privacy from the other people in the 
room (R. 254 at 56). The officers searched his bag of belongings at the outset of their 
encounter with him (R. 478 at 11-12). Hernandez, who had been fully cooperative with 
the police, denied having a gun when asked (R. 254 at 56-57). Because a handgun had 
been used, Mclnnes told Hernandez he was going to frisk him (R. 254 at 56-57). 
On these facts, there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court would have 
9At the 23B hearing, after appellate counsel for Hernandez challenged the legality 
of the search, Brede testified that he could not recall the conversation which preceded 
Hernandez's admission of having a gun (R. 478 at 98). 
14 
found that the frisk was not preceded by a consensual encounter, but was preceded by a 
seizure or arrest, requiring proof of reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause. See, e.g.. 
State v. Hargraves. 806 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah App. 1991). 
The State maintains that Hernandez substantially matched the robber's description, 
thus providing a reasonable suspicion that he was armed. State's brief at 26-27. 
This issue is obscured to an extent by Nieser's many inconsistent descriptions of 
the robber.10 
l0Nieser told dispatch that the robber was a male Hispanic, about twenty years old, 
five feet eight inches tall or five feet ten inches tall and weighing about one hundred and 
sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22, 38). 
At the preliminary hearing, he said the robber was about the same height as Nieser, 
57" or 5'8", and weighed 130 to 140 pounds (R. 253 at 5, 12). 
At trial, Nieser testified he was wearing one inch heels during the robbery, and had 
testified at the preliminary hearing that the robber was his height, 57" or 5'8" (R. 254 at 
31, 37-38), but could not recall having told the dispatcher that the robber's height was 
between 5f8" and 5?10" (R. 254 at 38). The robber was just over an arm's length away 
from him, and he stared at him for several minutes and believed the person was the same 
height as he is (R. 254 at 46). 
Hernandez is 5f4" (R. 254 at 75). 
At the preliminary hearing, Nieser testified that the robber wore a blue shirt with 
writing across the side or front of it in letters three to four inches tall (R. 253 at 5, 10). 
At trial, Nieser maintained that the writing was across the front of the shirt, and that the 
preliminary hearing transcript was wrong to indicate that he ever said it was across the 
side (R. 254 at 42). 
Officer Brede testified that the dispatch operator indicated that the robber was 
wearing white athletic shoes (R. 253 at 21), contrary to Nieser's preliminary hearing 
testimony that he did not notice the robber's shoes or provide a shoe description to the 
police (R. 253 at 13). At trial, Nieser testified that the robber was wearing white tennis 
shoes (R. 254 at 23). Nieser did not remember having had no recall of shoes at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 254 at 39). He remembered telling dispatch about the shoes, but 
later may have forgotten that detail (R. 254 at 39). 
Nieser acknowledged at trial that at the preliminary hearing, he had testified that 
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The State contends that perhaps Hernandez was wearing "footwear" at the time of 
the robbery but was barefoot when he was officially measured, which explains the 
discrepancy between Nieser's testimony that the robber was between 5f8" and 5'10", and 
Hernandez's actual height - 5f4ff. State's brief at 26. According to the State's own brief, 
the robber and Hernandez were both wearing "white athletic shoes." State's brief at 26. If 
Hernandez had been wearing athletic shoes with four to six inch platform soles, it would 
seem that this would be noted in the record at some point, and might have been used to 
suggest that Hernandez could not have run several blocks to commit the robbery in the 
minute between the end of his phone call with his aunt and the latest beginning of the 
robbery. 
The State suggests that Nieser described the robber as being "'a little Hispanic' 
male," as though Nieser described the robber as a diminutive Hispanic male. The phrase 
he thought the robber was Hispanic because of his goatee and hairdo, and also recalled 
denying that a certain hairdo and goatee meant a person was Hispanic (R. 254 at 44). He 
did not recall having said that he thought the suspect was Hispanic because his heart rate 
was up and it was dark at Freeway Transmission (R. 254 at 44), but that was indeed his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing (R. 253 at 8). When defense counsel alluded to 
Nieser's preliminary hearing testimony regarding why the robber looked Hispanic and 
asked him why he did, Nieser testified, "I don't know, he just did. He looked Hispanic to 
me." (R. 254 at 37). 
He did not tell dispatch about scarring or jewelry, but Hernandez' forehead was 
scarred, and he had an earing in his left ear on the night of his arrest (R. 254 at 45). 
The dispatch report originating from Nieser indicated that the robber's gun was 
black (R. 254 at 74). At the preliminary hearing, he described the gun as grey with some 
silver or chrome on it (R. 253 at 1-3, 9). At trial, he identified the gun the police seized 
from Hernandez as the robber's gun, despite the fact that the gun is not black and has no 
silver or chrome (R. 254 at 34-35). 
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"a little Hispanic" was Nieser's preliminary hearing answer to the question regarding the 
robber's race - that the robber "looked a little Hispanic and all of that." (R. 153 at 4-5). 
The arresting officer, who supposed thought Hernandez matched the description, 
conceded that Hernandez does not appear Hispanic, but looks Caucasian (R. 253 at 22). 
The State contends that Nieser told dispatch that the robber was 57" or 5'8ff. 
State's brief at 26. Actually, Nieser told dispatch that the robber was five feet eight 
inches to five feet ten inches tall (R. 254 at 21-22, 38). 
The State contends that Nieser told dispatch that the robber was 130-140 pounds. 
State's brief at 26. Actually, Nieser told dispatch that the robber weighed about one 
hundred and sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22, 38), in contrast to Hernandez's weight of 145 
pounds a week after his arrest (R. 254 at 75). 
The State contends that Nieser told dispatch the writing was across the front of the 
robber's shirt. State's brief at 26. At the preliminary hearing, Nieser testified that the 
robber wore a blue shirt with writing across the side or front of it in letters three to four 
inches tall (R. 253 at 5, 10). At trial, Nieser maintained that the writing was across the 
front of the shirt, and that the preliminary hearing transcript was wrong to indicate that he 
ever said it was across the side (R. 254 at 42). At the time of his arrest, 
The State maintains that Nieser told dispatch that the robber was wearing white 
athletic shoes. State's brief at 26. Officer Brede testified that the dispatch operator 
indicated that the robber was wearing white athletic shoes (R. 253 at 21), contrary to 
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Nieser's preliminary hearing testimony that he did not notice the robber's shoes or 
provide a shoe description to the police (R. 253 at 13). At trial, Nieser testified that the 
robber was wearing white tennis shoes (R. 254 at 23). Nieser did not remember having 
had no recall of shoes at the preliminary hearing (R. 254 at 39). He remembered telling 
dispatch about the shoes, but later may have forgotten that detail (R. 254 at 39). 
The State suggests that the discrepancy between the color of the robber's shirt 
(blue, according to Nieser), and the shirt Hernandez was wearing at the time of his arrest 
(black) is attributable to the fact that it was dark outside. State's brief at 27. This 
argument does not account for the facts in the record, which show that Hernandez was not 
wearing a blue shirt with writing on it at the time that the police approached and frisked 
him. He was wearing a different shirt, which was black, and after they lifted a few of the 
suspects shirts up, there was a blue one with writing on it, the same shirt as the robber 
wore(R.254at26,41).n 
On this record, Hernandez maintains that the frisk was illegal. See Opening Brief 
of Appellant at 42-46.12 
nIn a different argument regarding eyewitness identification, the State 
acknowledges the fact that at the time of his arrest, Hernandez was wearing two shirts 
over the one Nieser identified as having been worn by the robber. State's brief at 18. 
12The State indicates that counsel for Hernandez has implied without record 
support that trial counsel acknowledged that his failure to move to suppress was 
deliberate and without strategic basis. State's brief at 22 n. 11. Paragraph 4 of the 
affidavit of trial counsel, Exhibit 17, which was drafted by appellate counsel, indicates, "I 
did not consider filing a motion to suppress Mr. Hernandez's statements to the police and 
his gun." Page 42 of Hernandez's opening brief accurately states, 
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E. FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
The State presents the facts pertaining to the eyewitness identification issue largely 
in the light most favorable to its position that a motion to suppress would have been 
futile, State's brief at 16-19, and then contends that because the facts of this case make a 
less compelling case for suppression than those in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991), it would have been futile for trial counsel to have moved to suppress. 
Ramirez and its progeny recognize that substantial deference is due to the trial 
courts' factual findings in this arena, insulating those findings from reversal unless they 
are against the clear weight of the evidence. See State v. Hollen. 2002 UT 35, ^  28, 44 
P.3d 794, citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
The State cites Hollen for the proposition that Ramirez is the "benchmark against 
which challenges to eyewitness identification reliability are measured." State's brief at 
20. By reviewing paragraph 64 of Hollen, this Court can readily confirm that Ramirez is 
more correctly read and applied as recognizing trial courts' broad discretion to find facts 
regarding eyewitness identification reliability. See id.13 See also Ramirez at 784 (noting 
As is detailed in the Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel which was 
admitted at the 23B hearing, trial counsel did not file motions to suppress 
Mr. Hernandez's gun, statements to the police or eyewitness identifications, 
and had no strategic reason for abstaining from filing such motions. 
Counsel for Hernandez thus did not imply that the failure to move to suppress was 
deliberate, but accurately noted that trial counsel did not consider filing a motion. 
i3Paragraph 64 provides, 
"Considering the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision 
[to admit the eyewitness testimony] and giving due deference to the trial 
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that the court found it to be an "extremely close case" with a "troublesome" and 
"blatantly" suggestive showup, but ultimately deferring to the trial court's assessment of 
factual matters and assessment of demeanor evidence). 
It is entirely possible that the trial court would have found the relevant facts in this 
case in the light most favorable to suppression, and that he would have suppressed the 
eyewitness identification in this case. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 46-50. Because 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had trial counsel moved for 
suppression, this Court should order a new trial. See id. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Hernandez's conviction and order a new trial. 
judge's ability to appraise demeanor evidence," id. at 784, we conclude that 
the identifications were constitutionally reliable and therefore admissible. 
Regarding demeanor evidence, we note that the trial court found all the witnesses 
"to be credible persons." In addition, many of the circumstances bearing on 
reliability—lighting, viewing distance, consistency among the witnesses, and 
suggestibility of the identification procedure- compare very favorably to the 
eyewitness testimony deemed constitutionally reliable in Ramirez. Although 
considerably more time passed between the robberies and identifications in this 
case than in Ramirez, the passage of time was not so long as to force the 
conclusion that the identifications should not have been admitted into evidence. 
Overall, the factors bearing on reliability clearly indicate that the identifications in 
this case were at least as reliable as the identification in Ramirez. Accordingly, 
we conclude that admission of the eyewitness identifications into evidence 
did not violate Hollen's right to due process under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
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Respectfully submitted this August 15, 2005. 
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